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benefit of lower agency costs while also avoiding the cost of higher taxes. We identify this 
relationship by studying the effect of a regulatory shift in Norway from zero to positive 
dividend taxes for individuals, whereas intercorporate dividends remained tax-exempt. We 
find that the use of holding companies increases strongly after the tax reform, and that 
operating companies with a higher potential for agency conflicts are more often owned by 
holding companies. Dividends paid from operating companies to holding companies are 
higher when the operating company would face more severe agency conflicts if such 
payments were not made. The payout is also higher and more stable from operating 
companies than from holding companies. These findings are consistent with the notion that 
stockholders choose organizational forms that separate tax effects from agency effects in 
dividend policy.  
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1. Introduction 
Dividend policy is irrelevant for firm value in perfect capital markets. With potential agency 
conflicts between majority and minority stockholders, however, the payment of dividends 
becomes a vehicle for limiting the majority’s extraction of private benefits. In particular, the 
firm can reduce agency costs of majority-minority conflicts by paying out free cash flow to all 
stockholders based on their proportional cash flow rights. This payout shrinks the pool of 
financing for projects that benefit the majority stockholder at the minority’s expense (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1988)). 
 Although dividends may reduce agency costs in the dividend-paying firm, the payout 
is made costly by the taxation of dividend income received by the stockholders. Thus, optimal 
dividend policy involves a tradeoff between agency benefits and tax costs, and vehicles that 
reduce the severity of this tradeoff increase firm value. Our paper shows empirically how 
holding companies play such a cost-reducing role in a regulatory regime where dividend 
income is taxable for individuals, but not for corporations. In particular, we show that 
individuals use holding companies to own operating companies directly rather than indirectly. 
Moreover, we find that more dividends are paid through this channel the more serious the 
potential agency costs in the operating company. This happens because dividends paid from 
the operating company to the holding company reduce potential agency costs in the operating 
company by taking cash away from the controlling owner’s discretion. Since these 
intercorporate dividends are not taxed, the reduced agency costs do not come at the expense 
of increased tax costs. Therefore, the tradeoff between agency concerns and tax concerns 
becomes irrelevant. 
We examine a large sample of private Norwegian firms with a controlling stockholder 
that were exposed to a new tax law in 2006. The law involves a radical shift from the earlier 
0% to the current 28% tax rate on dividend income in excess of a deduction based on riskless 
returns. This tax applies to dividends paid to individual owners, but not to intercorporate 
dividends, which are tax-free.1 Since an operating company in our sample has both majority 
and minority stockholders, dividends may alleviate potential conflicts between the two 
stockholder groups. However, the tax reform increased the cost of such a dividend policy 
when the payout is made to individuals. At the same time, however, the reform left the tax 
cost of intercorporate dividends unchanged, since such payout continued to be tax-free. 
                                                 
1 Capital gains are taxed like dividends for a given owner type. Hence, corporations pay no taxes on dividends 
and capital gains, while individuals pay 28% tax on both dividends and capital gains after the riskless deduction. 
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Therefore, if reducing the potential for agency costs is important, and if dividend payout is a 
relevant tool for this purpose, we expect the tax reform to trigger a shift from direct 
ownership by individuals to their indirect ownership through holding companies. In addition, 
this shift should be stronger and the fraction of earnings paid to indirect owners should be 
higher and more stable the more serious the potential agency cost in the absence of such 
payments. 
Our findings support these hypotheses. The number of holding companies increases 
sharply after the tax reform, and more operating companies become indirectly owned.  
Moreover, the likelihood of an operating company being owned by a holding company 
increases with the potential conflict between the operating company’s owners. The underlying 
tradeoff between agency benefits and tax costs is not just reflected in the choice of 
organizational form, but also in the fraction of earnings distributed as dividends. Operating 
companies with higher potential agency costs choose higher and more stable payout ratios, 
and more so if the firm is controlled through a holding company. The payout is also higher 
from the operating company than from the holding company, and the difference increases 
with the conflict potential in the operating company. Hence, the operating company’s 
dividend policy seems to be driven more by the wish to reduce free cash flow than by the 
controlling owner’s immediate consumption needs. Overall, these findings suggest that 
agency conflicts matter for payout policy, that stockholders choose organizational forms that 
allow them to separate agency effects from tax effects of dividends, and that the value created 
by this separation justifies the expense of establishing the required organizational form. 
Like Faccio et al. (2001) and Morck and Yeung (2005), we examine indirect 
ownership. However, our setting and our results are quite different. For instance, Faccio et al. 
study pyramiding in business groups, finding evidence of rent extraction in East Asia, but not 
in Western Europe. While we do consider a setting with indirect ownership, there is little 
evidence of pyramiding, since most holding companies in our sample only have one owner. 
This means the holding company does not create the wedge between control rights and cash 
flow rights studied by Faccio et al. and by Morck and Yeung. Moreover, the proportion of 
firms with more than one level of indirect ownership is small in our sample.2 Consequently, 
while agency costs in the existing literature are driven by indirect ownership, we do quite the 
opposite by analyzing how indirect ownership actually reduces agency costs. Doe to this 
                                                 
2 77% of the holding companies in our sample have just one owner after the tax reform, while 15% had two. 
Prior to the tax reform, the proportions were 71% and 18%, respectively. Less than 1% of the operating firms in 
our sample have more than one level of pyramiding after the tax reform. 
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effect, taxing intercorporate dividends like in the US is costly because it reduces payout 
incentives and hence increases the cost of reducing agency conflicts. We find that under a 
regime of tax-free intercorporate dividends, stockholders establish organizational forms that 
allow for agency costs to be reduced in a tax-efficient way. This result shows that the net 
benefit of taxing intercorporate dividends is more multidimensional and less obviously 
positive than what is suggested by the current literature on dividends and agency costs. 
Starting from the seminal paper of Elton and Gruber (1970), the link between 
dividends and taxes has often been examined through the existence of dividend clienteles. 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) show in a theoretical paper that dividends could be used 
to attract tax-exempt institutional investors, who may be better at screening and monitoring. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) test this prediction empirically and find that although 
institutional investors are more likely to invest in dividend-paying companies, they do not 
prefer higher payout ratios. Desai and Jin (2011) find that financial institutions consider their 
investors’ tax preferences when choosing firms to invest in. Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan 
(2009) analyze the dividend preferences of corporate blockholders and find that, although 
subject to lower dividend taxes, they seem to prefer low or zero dividends, and mainly focus 
on the expansion of the firms they own.  
In contrast to this literature, we look at the interaction between agency concerns and 
tax concerns. We do not assume that certain investors are better monitors than others. We 
consider the dividend an instrument for reducing opportunistic behavior, and we study the 
effect of a tax change that may have led the investor from one tax status to another by 
changing organizational form. This transformation is available to all investors, allowing them 
to avoid the tax cost of dividends and at the same time reduce moral hazard. 
The existing research on dividends and taxes ignores the relationship to agency costs 
and mostly focuses on the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains (Bernheim (1991), 
Bernheim and Wantz (1995), Poterba (2004)). When dividend income taxes increase relative 
to capital gains taxes, stockholders have incentives to use repurchases as a cheaper substitute 
for dividends. Such a setting makes the dividend payout sensitive to changes in the relative 
taxation of dividends and capital gains.3 In our case, however, dividends and capital gains are 
taxed the same way for a given investor type both before and after the regulatory shock. 
Therefore, concerns for the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains cannot motivate a 
                                                 
3 The exception is the information asymmetry setting where the higher tax cost of dividends actually makes 
dividends more attractive, since high payout becomes  a credible signal of high firm quality (Bernheim (1991), 
Bernheim and Wantz (1995)). 
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switch from one payout policy to another.4 Since the tax reform increases the cost of paying 
dividends to individuals rather than to corporations, however, the new tax regime may induce 
lower payout and higher agency costs. However, we argue there is an opposing force driven 
by the stockholders’ ability to change organizational.  
Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) analyze the Norwegian 2006 tax reform, finding that 
dividend payout increases prior to the reform, drops just after the reform, and that the number 
of holding companies increases around reform. Alstadsæter, Kopczuk, and Telle (2011) 
examine the importance of social networks in the propagation of changing organizational 
form at the time of the tax reform. However, these studies do not relate the change in dividend 
payout and organizational form to firm characteristics, however, they are silent on the 
importance of any other dividend determinant than taxes. In contrast, we analyze the 
individual firm, how payout policy interact with organizational form, and how this 
relationship depends on both dividend taxation and the potential for agency costs.   
Finally, our sample is based on private firms, where majority ownership is much more 
common than among public firms. We therefore bring evidence extending the insight into 
dividend payout policy in private firms as recently provided by Michaely and Roberts (2012). 
Using the exogenous shock provided by the tax reform, our findings support their intuition 
that concerns for agency costs play an important role in the payout policy of private firms. 
However, since an agency-motivated dividend policy has tax effects, and since the tax effect 
depends on owner type via organizational form, we study both components rather than just 
one. 
The next section presents the regulatory setting and the resulting incentives to pay 
dividends and establish holding companies. Section 3 specifies hypotheses and empirical 
models, while section 4 presents our data sources and sampling procedures. Section 5 
explores the decision to establish a holding company, and section 6 analyzes the dividend 
determinants. We summarize and conclude in section 7. 
 
2. Regulation and incentives 
The Norwegian tax system levies a flat 28% tax rate on corporate, financial, and labor 
income. Labor income is also subject to a progressive surtax. Dividends were tax-exempt 
                                                 
4 Although stock repurchases have been allowed in Norway since 1999, the incidence of repurchases in our 
sample is minimal. Repurchases tend to be used only by large firms with dispersed ownership.  
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until the end of 2005, while the tax on capital gains was zero in most cases and hence equal to 
the zero tax rate on dividends.5 
The tax reform was announced on March 26, 2004 and implemented on January 1, 
2006. The new regulation introduced a 28% tax on dividend income and capital gains in 
excess of a threshold amount based on riskless returns. In contrast, corporations do not pay 
taxes neither on dividend income nor capital gains.6 During the transition period from the old 
to the new regime, realized capital gains up to March 26, 2004 were made tax-free.  
Moreover, individuals could, under certain conditions, transfer personally held shares to a 
holding company in 2005 without triggering capital gains taxes. The cost of setting up 
holding companies was therefore temporarily reduced in the transition to the new tax regime. 
Overall, the tax reform increased the cost of dividends paid to individuals, but not to 
companies. The transition period facilitated the switch to indirect ownership, and taxes paid 
by a given tax payer on dividends, capital gains, salaries, and interest income were all aligned. 
Taxing individuals but not corporations for dividend income is a characteristic feature 
of the tax system in most countries. An important exception is the US, where both individuals 
and corporations are taxed. The two tax systems have different effects across the various 
functions of dividends. For instance, dividends used to fund consumption need to reach the 
individual and will therefore be taxed under both systems. In contrast, dividends as a tool for 
reducing agency costs cannot be used without tax costs in the US. In Norway and many other 
countries, however, dividends can be paid with no tax drain if the recipient is a company.  
 Prior to the Norwegian tax reform, every function of payout could be fulfilled at no 
tax cost. After the tax reform some functions can only be fulfilled at zero tax costs in an 
intercorporate context. Hence, stockholders have incentives to switch from direct ownership 
to indirect. In a holding structure, the operating company pays the dividend to the holding 
company. The payment moves this part of the operating company’s free cash flow beyond the 
control of its majority stockholder without generating taxes. Obviously, the cash will 
eventually be paid from the holding company to individual investors, and hence be taxed at 
the personal tax rate. Nevertheless, moving the cash away from the majority-controlled 
company into the holding company reduces the risk that the cash will finance consumption of 
private benefits for the majority rather than being shared with the minority. The switch to 
                                                 
5 The exception was in 2001, when a tax rate of 11% applied to dividend income above a certain threshold. 
6 In the 2008-2010 period, corporations paid a 0.67% tax (3% of 28%) on dividend and capital gains in excess of 
the riskless return. 
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indirect ownership therefore allows the separation between the tax effect and the agency 
effect of dividend payout. 
 Reducing agency conflicts at a minimum tax cost may not be the only reason for 
establishing holding companies. Another incentive comes from heterogeneous liquidity needs 
among the operating company’s stockholders. Given the tax cost of dividends paid by 
individual investors after the tax reform, they will only want to receive dividends when the 
liquidity benefit of dividends exceeds the personal tax cost. The problem is, however, that 
dividends are proportional cash disbursements to all stockholders based on their cash flow 
rights in the firm. Thus, dividends paid out to cover one stockholder’s personal liquidity need 
may generate an unwanted tax cost for another stockholder who does not need the liquidity. 
Indirect ownership may solve this problem by allowing the cash to be paid out as dividends to 
holding companies with no tax consequences. Only investors faced with a sufficiently large 
liquidity need will then withdraw cash as dividends from their holding company and pay the 
resulting dividend tax. Hence, holding companies are useful also for managing uncoordinated 
liquidity shocks across heterogeneous stockholders in the same operating company.  
 Based on these incentives, we examine how stockholders react to the tax reform by 
establishing holding companies in order to separately deal with agency effects and tax effects. 
We consider the dividend from the operating company to the holding company as well as the 
dividend from the holding company to its individual owners. The former payout is more 
likely to be governed by agency concerns, since tax concerns can be ignored. In contrast, the 
holding company’s dividend decision should be driven by the ultimate owners’ consumption 
concerns, since the cash must get to the individual in order to finance personal needs. 
Moreover, agency conflicts and asymmetric liquidity needs are only second-order concerns in 
the holding companies of our sample, since more than three quarters of them have just one 
owner. 
 
3. Hypotheses and models 
Our hypotheses as presented in Table 1 concern the incentives to establish holding companies 
(hypotheses H1 and H2), and the determinants of the dividend payout from operating 
companies and holding companies (H3-H6).  
The first hypothesis (H1) states that the tax reform increases the use of holding 
companies. We test this prediction by analyzing whether there was an increase in the number 
of holding companies around the tax reform, and whether more operating companies have 
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holding companies among their owners.  We use t-tests for difference in the mean number of 
firms before and after the tax reform and also a difference-in-difference approach based on 
annual observations. 
H2 states that the tendency to set up holding companies after the tax reform is stronger 
the more pressing the potential agency problem in the operating company. We estimate a logit 
model to test whether such operating companies are more likely to be owned through a 
holding company.  
We use two measures for the potential agency conflict in the firm. The first measure is 
the firm’s free cash flow, which represents the funding source of private benefits for the 
majority stockholder. Our second measure is based on the idea that the higher the cash flow 
right of the controlling stockholder, the lower the conflict potential with the minority. This 
happens because the more of the firm’s equity the majority owns, the more of the lost firm 
value is internalized if the majority decides to not pay dividends but instead divert the cash for 
private benefits at the minority’s expense. Consequently, our second proxy for potential 
agency problems is the fraction of cash flow rights held by the controlling stockholder in the 
operating company.  
The potential agency problem between majority and minority owners is more serious 
the higher the free cash flow and the lower the ownership concentration. Under the substitute 
logic of dividends and agency costs, where dividends are used to mitigate agency problems 
(LaPorta et al. (2000)), the use of holding companies will increase with the free cash flow and 
decrease with the majority stake. The expected relationship is the opposite under the outcome 
logic, where the majority uses the power to opportunistically exploit the minority by paying 
less dividends the larger the potential agency conflict. In the following, we only specify the 
hypotheses under the substitute logic, since they are always the opposite under the outcome 
logic. Berzins et al. (2012) find support for the substitute logic in their analysis of dividend 
policy in Norwegian private firms. 
 We include a series of control variables, since some operating companies are more 
likely to pay dividends than others even in the absence of agency concerns. This dividend 
policy may induce the establishment of holding companies for tax reasons alone. Following 
the literature on such classic dividend determinants (DeAngelo et al. (2009)), we expect that 
the tendency to establish holding companies increases with the size of the operating company 
and decreases with financial constraints. We measure size by the log of total revenue. 
Financial constraints are measured by the ratio of sales to assets, the logic being that higher 
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sales relative to assets reflects lower slack, higher investment needs, and hence a lower 
dividend propensity.   
Finally, we expect that operating firms with more risky revenue are more likely to set 
up holding companies. On the one hand, more risky revenue generally produces lower payout. 
In our case, however, where the new tax applies to dividends above the risk-free deduction, 
the owners of risky firms are penalized tax-wise. We expect this tax concern to be the more 
important one for the decision to establish indirect ownership. The volatility of sales growth 
over the last six years is used to measure risk. 
H2 is tested by estimating the following model, where HC is a dummy variable which 
is 1 if the operating company has a holding company among its owners and 0 otherwise: 
 
(1) 
1 2
3 4 5
it it it
it it it it
HC Ownership concentration Free cash flow
Size Financial  constraints Risk
α β β
β β β ε
= + +
+ + + +  
 
 H3 argues that the payout of operating companies in holding structures is partially 
driven by a concern for agency costs. According to our logic, holding companies are 
established to reduce the cost of extracting cash from operating companies. Consequently, 
dividends from the operating company should be higher the more important the agency 
concern in that company. In order to test this hypothesis, we regress the operating company’s 
payout ratio on the dividend determinants from Equation (1). If dividends are used to reduce 
agency conflicts and if holding companies are used to reduce dividend taxes, the operating 
company’s payout will relate negatively to ownership concentration and positively to free 
cash flow. We control once again for firm size, financial constraints, and risk, expecting a 
positive, negative, and negative relationship to the payout ratio, respectively. 
H4 compares the payout from operating companies with and without a holding 
company among its owners. The hypothesis states that dividend are higher in a holding 
structure, and that this organizational form will make the operating company’s payout relate 
more strongly to its inherent agency problems. Our rationale for H4 is that the cost of 
addressing the agency problem by dividends is smaller when the owner is not an individual. If 
holding companies are established for other reasons, however, the relationship in H4 should 
not be observed. First, dividends may be smaller rather than higher under a holding structure 
set up to facilitate the extraction of private benefits through pyramiding. Second, there will be 
no relationship between agency problems and payout if the holding company is constructed to 
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handle asymmetric liquidity shocks. We test H4 in the following way, studying the payout 
ratio D of operating companies with and without a holding company among its owners: 
 
(2) 
1 2
3
4 5
6 7 8
it it it
it it
it it it
it it it
D Holding company Ownership concentration
Ownership concentration Holding company
Free cash flow Free cash flow Holding company
Size Financial  constraints Risk
α β β
β
β β
β β β
= + +
+ ⋅
+ + ⋅
+ + + + itε
  
 
We use the dividend payout ratio of the operating company as the dependent variable and add 
a dummy variable which we also interact with the two proxies for potential agency costs. This 
dummy variable, Holding companyit, is 1 if firm i is an operating company with a holding 
company among its owners at time t and 0 otherwise. We expect operating companies with a 
holding company to pay more dividends than operating companies outside holding structures. 
The payout difference will be larger the more severe the potential agency cost in an operating 
company controlled by a holding company. Hence, we predict β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 < 0, β4 > 0, 
and β5 > 0. Like under H3 we expect β6 > 0, β7 < 0, and β8 < 0. 
 H5 compares the payout in operating companies and holding companies. The 
hypothesis argues that the payout from the operating company is higher than that from the 
related holding company, and that the positive difference increases with potential agency 
costs in the operating company. The rationale is that payout to the holding company reflects 
persistent agency concerns and is also tax-free. In contrast, dividends from the holding 
company have less of a role in reducing agency costs, are taxable, and are associated with 
occasional liquidity shocks for the stockholders. Once taken out of the operating company, 
the cash can be saved in the holding company if not needed for consumption. The fact that the 
cash is saved in the holding company rather than the operating company illustrates the 
importance of control over cash as an agency problem. Unlike when testing H4, the sample 
used for H5 only includes operating companies with holding companies among their owners. 
Our model is the following: 
 
 (3)
 
1 2
3 4 5 6
7 8
it it it
it it it it
it it it
DH Ownership concentration Free cash flow
Size Financial  constraints Risk DO
Pre-existing holding company Minority owner in holding company
α β β
β β β β
β β ε
= + +
+ + + +
+ + +
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DH is the payout ratio of the holding company.  The independent variables in the first two 
lines of the model relate to the operating company. Like in (2), we expect β1 < 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 
0, β4 < 0, and β5 < 0.  
DO is the payout ratio of the operating company, which we expect to be smaller than 
and also positively to the holding company’s payout (0 < β6 < 1). The dummy variable Pre-
existing holding company is 1 if the holding company was established before the tax reform 
and 0 otherwise. We expect β7 > 0, since an older holding company has supposedly 
accumulated more cash for non-tax reasons than a younger one and will hence distribute more 
of its earnings. Finally, the dummy variable Minority owner in holding company is 1 if there 
are at least two ultimate owners of the holding company and 0 otherwise. Based on the 
substitute logic for dividend policy and agency conflicts, we expect that the payout will be 
higher when there is a potential majority-minority issue in the holding company (β8 > 0). 
 As already argued, we expect the agency problem in the operating company to 
be more persistent than the more occasional liquidity need driving the payout from the 
holding company. Therefore, H6 predicts that the dividend from the holding company will be 
the more volatile.  
 
 
4. Data  
The data set is based on the population of firms with limited liability in Norway over the 
period 2000-2010. The data quality is unusually high, since the law mandates a standardized 
set of full accounting statements certified by a public auditor for every firm regardless of 
listing status, size, and industry. Failure to submit this information within 17 months after 
fiscal year-end triggers automatic liquidation by the court. The data includes family 
relationship by blood and marriage between all owners, directors, and the CEO.7 
Our research design requires information about operating companies and the holding 
companies through which the operating company is partially owned. We apply a series of 
filters to build the sample of operating companies with potential agency problems between 
controlling and minority stockholders.  
                                                 
7  Accounting, ownership, and board data are delivered by Experian (www.experian.com). Data on family 
relationships are from Skattedirektoratet, which is a state agency. All data items have been received in electronic 
form and stored in the data base of the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.edu/ccgr). 
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1. Financial firms are excluded to avoid the impact of peculiar regulatory capital 
requirements and accounting rules. We also exclude utility and public administration 
firms, and in general firms where the government is the majority stockholder. 
2. To avoid passive firms, a sample firm must have positive sales, assets, and employment. 
3. The firm must have consistent accounting statements. For instance, total assets need to 
equal total liabilities plus stockholders’ equity. 
4. The firm must have a majority owner and more than one owner. This means more than 
50% of the share capital must be held by a family with one or more stockholders, or by a 
firm whose ultimate owners cannot be identified. 8  Since our data set includes all firms in 
the economy, we can base this majority filter on ultimate control. In order to identify all 
companies the owner controls we start from a given owner and follow his controlling 
stakes in various companies, and subsequently the controlling stakes of those companies. 
This procedure allows us to determine which ultimate owner, if any, controls a given 
company. 
5. We exclude business groups and subsidiaries unless controlled by a holding company.  
6. We ignore the smallest 5% of firms by assets, sales, and employment. 
 
Summing up the sampling procedure for operating companies, our basic sample is all 
but the very smallest non-financial, non-utility, non-state firms with significant economic 
activity, more than one stockholder, and which are ultimately controlled by a majority 
stockholder who is either a domestic family with one or more members, a domestic 
institutional investor, or a foreign entity.  
We identify holding companies as firms set up to invest in operating companies. In 
order to qualify as a holding company the firm must own shares in an operating company and 
have either sales to assets below 5% (reflecting no significant economic activity) or have the 
official industry code dedicated to investment firms. The activity filter is applied because we 
only want holding companies that are used mainly to manage their owners’ investment in 
operating companies. We have three reasons for this choice. First, we want to ignore 
dividends in a business group, which can be distorted by tax-motivated transfers between the 
                                                 
8 A family is defined as a married couple and its minor children. Owners who cannot be identified would be 
institutions, foreign corporations or foreign personal investors. Since we do not know who owns a foreign 
corporations, we cannot identify its ultimate owners. We also do not know family relationships for foreigners. 
 
 
 13 
 
group members, including the parent company. Second, pyramiding through layers of 
operating companies can be used to extract private benefits, which has already been addressed 
in the literature (Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001)). In contrast, we focus on how indirect 
ownership is used to reduce agency costs at zero tax costs. Third, since pyramiding in 
business groups is less widespread in Norway than in many other countries, we are not losing 
important parts of the overall economy by excluding them. 
Since we focus on the agency conflict between majority and minority stockholders, we 
use a sample of firms where the controlling block can be clearly identified. This approach 
allows us to study how the majority is sharing free cash flows with the minority. Our test is 
based on keeping the majority control of the firm constant while exploiting the variation in 
the split of cash flow rights between the majority and the minority. Finally, since we want to 
avoid ambiguity concerning control, we ignore potential blockholder coalitions in the spirit of 
Laeven and Levine (2008). Instead, we focus on the easily identifiable coalition based on 
family connections.  
  
5. Establishing holding companies 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample firms. The second column of results shows 
that about 16,000 operating companies pass our filters. Column four documents that the 
number of holding companies increases very strongly from 735 companies in 2000 to 6,719 in 
2010. As expected, the large jump happens around the tax reform, as the number of holdings 
companies increases by 460% in 2005. 
Column five shows that the number of owners per operating company stays around 
2.6. Importantly, however, column six reveals that while 6% of the operating companies have 
a holding company among its owners before the tax reform, the number rises to 26% after. At 
the same time, the average number of owners per holding company in column seven 
decreases from 2.75 to 1.61, and the average number of operating companies per holding 
company in column 8 drops from 1.35 to 1.11. Both trends reflect the creation of new holding 
companies. 
Using 2006 as the event year, we have estimated a difference-in-difference model to 
compare the number of operating companies and holding companies before and after the 
event. The estimates support the results from the tests of difference in means from Table 2 
 
 
 14 
 
showing that the tax reform causes an abnormal growth in indirect ownership.9 Overall, the 
observed pattern is consistent with hypothesis H1 from Table 1.  
The findings in Table 2 reflect a striking shift after the tax reform in the relationship 
between firms and owners. In particular, there is a growing layer of holding companies acting 
as intermediaries between operating companies and their ultimate owners. Hypothesis H2 
predicts that the existence of holding companies depends on the intensity of potential agency 
conflicts in the operating firm. Table 3 estimates how the likelihood of establishing holding 
companies depends on such firm characteristics. 
 Using data from the post-reform years (2006-2010) and controlling for the firm’s size, 
financial constraints, and risk according to model (1), we find that operating firms where 
majority stockholders have a smaller ownership block are more likely to be owned by holding 
companies. This relationship is also true for companies with higher free cash flow. Both 
results are consistent with the substitute model of dividends, where higher potential agency 
problems induce higher payout. The findings also support the prediction in H2 that agency 
concerns induce the use of indirect ownership in order to mitigate agency costs without 
incurring tax costs. As for the control variables, the table shows that as predicted, firms with 
majority ownership are more prone to be owned indirectly when they are large, risky, and less 
financially constrained.  
 
6. Dividend policy and organizational form  
Hypothesis H3 states that the payout from the operating company to the holding company is 
partially driven by the majority stockholder’s concern for agency costs. Table 4 regresses the 
payout ratio of the operating company on proxies for potential agency conflicts and on 
controls. The sample consists of all operating firms that have a holding company among their 
owners. 
 The estimates show that higher payout is associated with a lower equity share for the 
controlling stockholder and with a higher free cash flow. Therefore, the fraction of earnings 
paid from the operating company to the holding company is larger the higher the potential 
agency costs in the operating company. This result is once more consistent with the substitute 
logic and with the use of holding companies to mitigate stockholder conflicts in a tax-
                                                 
9 We estimated is model Y =a+b1X+b2Z+b3XZ, where Y is the number of firms in the year, and X and Z are 0/1 
dummy variables. X=1 if the observation is for a holding company, while Z=1 if the year is after 2005. The 
estimate of interest is b3, which we find to be positive and strongly significant. 
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minimizing way. As predicted, larger firm size and lower risk increases payout, while the 
positive relationship between payout and financial constraints is not in line with the 
hypothesis. 
 Our hypothesis H4 predicts that indirect ownership through a holding company rather 
than directly is associated with higher payout, and that this difference is larger the more 
serious the potential agency conflict. Table 5 shows the results of testing this proposition, 
which we specified in model (2). Unlike in Table 4, the sample includes all operating 
companies, regardless of whether or not there is a holding company among the owners. 
The estimates show that the existence of holding companies is associated with higher 
payout from the operating company. The two interaction terms document that the effect of a 
holding company is also stronger for firms with higher potential for conflicts of interest as 
measured by low cash flow rights by the majority owner and by high free cash flow as a 
potential financing source for private benefits.  Hence, the existence and the use of holding 
companies seem motivated by a desire to mitigate agency costs at minimum tax costs. These 
results are consistent with our prediction. 
 H5 conjectures that the payout will be higher from the operating company than from 
the holding company, and that the difference will be larger the more pressing the potential 
agency problem in the operating company. As usual, we measure the payout of the operating 
company as the ratio between its cash dividend and operating earnings. The payout ratio of 
the holding company is measured as the dividend paid by the holding company divided by the 
earnings of the operating company times the holding company’s fractional ownership share in 
the operating company. This denominator is motivated by the fact that since the holding 
companies in our sample do not have operating activity, their main function is to receive and 
distribute investment returns received from operating companies. Hence, the appropriate 
starting point for normalizing the holding company’s dividend is the operating firm’s 
earnings. Since the holding company only owns a fraction of these earnings, we adjust for its 
fractional ownership share.10  
Table 6 presents the findings based on model (3), where the key independent variable 
is Dividends from operating company. The estimates show that when we regress the 
dividends of the holding company on the dividends of the operating company while 
                                                 
10 There are also cases where one holding company owns shares in several holding companies. In that case, we 
calculate the share of the holding company’s earnings and payout corresponding to the specific operating 
company. We find that share as the ratio between the book value of the equity owned by the holding company in 
that particular operating company and the total book value of all the holding company’s equity holdings. 
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controlling for potential agency conflicts, the regression coefficient is positive and 
significantly below 1. As predicted by H5, this result shows that dividends of the operating 
company and the holding company are positively correlated, and that less dividends are paid 
from holding companies than from operating companies. 11  Alternative specifications in 
models (A) - (C) produce identical results. 
Finally, Table 7 relates the dividend volatility of the holding company to the dividend 
volatility of the operating company. H6 is tested by constructing payout volatility pairs for 
holding companies and related operating companies that both pay dividends at least once 
during the sample period. Payout volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the 
dividend payout divided by the mean payout over the period. Only the portion of dividends 
reflecting the holding company’s stake in the operating company is considered. We rank the 
volatility pairs across five quintiles based on the holding company’s dividend volatility. 
Within each quintile, we compare the mean dividend volatility for holding companies and 
operating companies,  expecting the former to exceed the latter. 
As predicted, the estimates show that the payout is generally more volatile in the 
holding company than in the operating company that the holding company has invested in. 
The only exception is in the quintile of lowest volatility, where the opposite is true. The 
patterns are consistent in the full sample period and in the subperiod 2008-2010.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Analyzing a large sample of majority-controlled private firms, we find a distinct relationship 
between tax concerns and agency concerns in dividend policy. Our key to identifying this 
relationship is a tax reform which introduced taxes on dividend income and capital gains for 
individuals, but not for corporations. We document that this change in tax regime 
dramatically increases the use of tax-exempt holding companies, particularly by majority 
owners of operating companies that have serious potential agency conflicts. We also find that 
dividend payments from operating companies to holding companies are higher when the 
operating company would face particularly severe agency problems in the absence of such 
payments. Moreover, the presence of holding companies in the ownership structure tends to 
increase the fraction of earnings paid out as dividends from the operating company, especially 
                                                 
11 The coefficient could be above one if the holding company makes additional returns on the cash it 
receives from the operating company, or if it realizes capital gains. It could be 1, or very close to 1, if the holding 
company simply pays out the dividends it receives from the operating company. We get a coefficient around 
25%, which is both statistically and economically very far below 1. 
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if the potential is large for conflicts of interest among the stockholders. The payout is also 
higher and less volatile from operating companies than from holdings companies. 
 These results document the notion that changes in dividend taxation may induce 
changes in ownership towards the more tax-efficient way of owning stock. Specifically, our 
evidence is consistent with the idea that payout policy depends on the stockholders’ concerns 
for agency costs, taxes, and particularly for the interaction between the two. Stockholders take 
the costly step of establishing holding companies when the potential for reduced agency 
conflicts and lower taxes is sufficiently high. Such an organizational form allows stockholders 
to choose a dividend policy that keeps agency costs low while simultaneously minimizing the 
tax burden. 
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Table 1: The hypotheses  
 
H1: Stockholders establish holding companies to reduce taxes on dividend income 
• Holding companies are more common after the tax reform than before  
 
H2: The use of holding companies increases with potential agency costs in the operating 
company 
• An operating company with high potential agency costs is more often controlled by a 
holding company after the tax reform than before 
 
H3: The dividend from an operating company to a holding company increases with potential 
agency costs in the operating company 
• The payout ratio of an operating company controlled by a holding company is higher 
the more serious the potential agency problem in the operating company 
 
H4: Dividends from an operating company are higher in holding structures than in non-
holding structures. This difference increases with potential agency costs in the operating 
company in the holding structure 
•  The operating company’s payout ratio is higher and relates more positively to its 
agency problems when the operating company has a holding company among its 
owners 
 
H5: Dividends paid by the operating company to the holding company is larger than 
dividends paid from the holding company to its owners. The difference increases with 
potential agency costs in the operating company 
• The difference between the payout ratios in the operating company and the holding 
company is positive and increasing with potential agency costs in the operating 
company 
 
H6: Dividends from the operating company to the holding company will vary less than 
dividends from the holding company to its investors 
• The volatility of the payout ratio is higher for the holding company than for the 
operating company 
Table 2: Operating companies, holding companies, and their owners
Year
Total 
number of 
operating 
companies
Number of 
operating 
companies 
with multiple 
owners
Number of 
owners in 
operating 
companies
Number of 
holding 
companies
Number of 
owners per 
operating 
company
 % of operating 
companies with 
holding 
company as an 
owner
Number of 
owners per 
holding 
company 
 Number of 
operating 
companies 
per holding 
company
Number of 
holding 
companies 
per operating 
company
2000 40,490 17,075 40,001 735 2.56 5.2% 2.58 1.39 1.10
2001 41,677 17,579 41,233 809 2.59 5.9% 2.85 1.43 1.03
2002 41,882 17,654 41,347 852 2.57 5.6% 2.92 1.32 1.07
2003 43,268 18,086 42,643 881 2.57 5.5% 2.78 1.33 1.03
2004 43,964 17,959 42,315 1,074 2.56 6.3% 2.59 1.30 1.06
2005 42,333 16,111 38,104 5,995 2.55 19.2% 1.84 1.10 1.30
2006 40,534 15,165 35,149 6,235 2.46 21.7% 1.48 1.10 1.30
2007 42,261 14,124 33,754 6,724 2.60 27.2% 1.56 1.11 1.29
2008 42,358 13,464 32,484 6,814 2.64 29.3% 1.61 1.13 1.29
2009 41,912 12,826 30,909 6,911 2.62 30.1% 1.59 1.12 1.31
2010 39,382 11,550 28,092 6,719 2.64 31.4% 1.56 1.12 1.30
Average 41,824 15,599 36,912 3,977 2.58 17.03 % 2.12 1.22 1.19
2000 - 2004 42,256 17,671 41,508 870 2.57 5.70 % 2.75 1.35 1.06
2005 - 2010 41,463 13,873 33,082 6,566 2.58 26.07 % 1.61 1.11 1.30
p-value, difference 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table presents aggregate statistics on operating companies, holding companies, and their owners. An operating company is sampled from the population
of private limited liability Norwegian firms which are not a financial, not part of a business group, not majority-owned by the government, has consistent
accounting statements, and at least 50% ownership by a nuclear-family based unit (couples and their under-age children). A holding company has some
ownership stake in an operating company and has either a sales/assets ratio under 5% or uses the Statistics Norway sector code for a holding company.
Ownership is based on ultimate cash flow rights. We exclude operating companies where one stockholder owns more than 90% of the equity. Except for the
first column of results we exclude single-owner operating firms.
Table 3: Determinants  of the decision to establish a holding company 
Variable Coefficient p
Intercept -7.9999 <.0001
Ownership concentration -0.3945 <.0001
Free cash flow 0.8123 <.0001
Size 0.9131 <.0001
Financial constraints -0.2223 <.0001
Risk 0.5821 <.0001
Pseudo R2 0.1672
Number of observations 57,238
This table shows the results of estimating the probability that the operating company has a 
holding company among its owners, given a series of operating company characteristics
as specified in the left column. The dependent variable in this logistic regression is a
dummy variable which is 1 if the operating company has a holding company among its
owners and 0 otherwise. Every independent variable relates to an operating company,
which is sampled from the population of non-listed limited liability Norwegian firms that
is not a financial, not part of a business group, not majority-owned by the government,
has consistent accounting statements, and has at least 50% ownership by a nuclear-family-
based unit. A holding company must have a stake in the operating company and either a
sales/assets ratio below 5% or use the Statistics Norway sector code for holding
companies. Ownership concentration is the ultimate share of the firm's largest owner. An
owner is a nuclear family unit (a couple with minor children) or a non-personal investor.
Free cash flow is cash flow from operations divided by sales, Size is the log of sales in
MNOK, Financial constraints is sales over assets, and Risk is the standard deviation of
sales growth over minimum three and maximum six preceding years. The model includes
industry controls. All variables are standardized, and we winzorize Free cash flow, Risk,
Financial constraints, and Size at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. The sample is pooled for
2006-2010.  
Table 4: The determinants of dividends from an operating company in a holding structure 
Variable Coefficient p
Intercept 0.0835 0.0183
Ownership concentration -0.1371 0.0010
Free cash flow 0.5695 <.0001
Size 0.0286 <.0001
Financial constraints 0.0068 0.0123
Risk -0.1384 <.0001
Adjusted R2 0.0923
Number of observations 13,219
The dependent variable of the model in this table is the payout ratio, which we define as cash
dividends to net operating earnings. All variables in the model relate to an operating company,
which is sampled from the population of non-listed limited liability Norwegian firms that is not a
financial, not part of a business group, not majority-owned by the government, has consistent
accounting statements, and has at least 50% ownership by a nuclear-family-based unit. A holding
company must have a stake in the operating company and either a sales/assets ratio below 5% or
use the Statistics Norway sector code for holding companies. Ownership concentration is the
ultimate share of the firm's largest owner. An owner is a nuclear family unit (a couple with minor
children) or a non-personal investor. Free cash flow is cash flow from operations divided by sales,
Size is the log of sales in MNOK, Financial constraints is sales over assets, and Risk is  the standard 
deviation of sales growth over minimum three and maximum six preceding years. The model
includes industry controls, and all variables are standardized. The payout ratio is winsorized at the
0% and 98% values, while Free cash flow, Risk, Financial constraints, and Size are winsorized at
the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. The estimated errors are heteroscedasticity consistent, and the sample is
pooled for 2006-2010.  
Table 5: Dividends inside vs. outside a holding structure
Variable Coefficient p
Intercept -0.1703 <.0001
Holding company 0.1183 <.0001
Ownership concentration -0.0464 0.0006
Ownership concentration*Holding company -0.0926 0.0003
Free cash flow 0.3544 <.0001
Free cash flow*Holding company 0.2389 <.0001
Size 0.0442 <.0001
Financial constraints -0.0075 <.0001
Risk -0.0948 <.0001
Adjusted R2 0.1055
Number of observations 47,366
This table shows the results of estimating a model where the dependent variable is the payout
ratio, which we define as cash dividends to operating earnings. All variables in the model relate
to an operating company, which is sampled from the population of non-listed limited liability
Norwegian firms that is not a financial, not part of a business group, not majority-owned by the
government, has consistent accounting statements, and has at least 50% ownership by a nuclear-
family-based unit. Holding company is a dummy variable which is 1 if the operating company
has a holding company among its owners and 0 otherwise. A holding company must have a stake
in the operating company and either sales/assets ratio under 5% or be classified by Statistics
Norway as a holding company. Ownership concentration is the ultimate share of the firm's
largest owner. An owner is a nuclear family unit (a couple with minor children) or a non-
personal investor. Free cash flow is cash flow from operations divided by sales, Size is the log of
sales in MNOK, Financial constraints is sales over assets, and Risk is the standard deviation of
sales growth over minimum three and maximum six preceding years. The model includes
industry controls, and all variables are standardized. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 0% and
98% values, while Free cash flow, Risk, Financial constraints, and Size are winsorized at the
0.5% and 99.5% tails. The estimated errors are heteroscedasticity consistent, and the sample is
pooled for 2006-2010.
Table 6: The dividend from the holding company
Variable Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient p
Intercept -0.0468 0.1245 0.1305 <.0001 0.0842 <.0001
Ownership concentration -0.0927 <.0001 -0.0797 <.0001
Free cash flow 0.1420 <.0001 0.1127 <.0001
Size 0.0213 <.0001
Financial constraints 0.0016 0.5018
Risk -0.0277 0.0184
Dividends from operating company 0.2543 <.0001 0.2429 <.0001 0.2253 <.0001
Pre-existing holding company 0.0131 0.1964
Minority owner in holding company -0.0100 0.1225
Adjusted R2 0.0751 0.0530 0.0427
Number of observations 12,348 15,901 19,605
The dependent variable of the model in this table is the payout ratio, which we define as cash dividends to net operating earnings. Ownership
concentration, Free cash flow, Size, Financial constraints, and Risk are measured at the operating company, which is sampled from the
population of non-listed limited liability Norwegian firms that is not a financial, not part of a business group, not majority-owned by the
government, has consistent accounting statements, and has at least 50% ownership by a nuclear-family-based unit. A holding company must
have a stake in the operating company and either sales/assets ratio under 5% or be classified by Statistics Norway as a holding company.
Ownership concentration is the ultimate share of the firm's largest owner. An owner is a nuclear family unit (a couple with minor children) or
a non-personal investor.Free cash flow is cash flow from operations divided by sales, Size is the log of sales in MNOK, Financial constraints
is sales over assets, and Risk is the standard deviation of sales growth over minimum three and maximum six preceding years. Pre-existing
holding company is 1 if the holding company was established before the tax reform in 2006 and 0 otherwise. Minority owner in holding
company is 1 if there are at least two ultimate owners of the holding company and 0 otherwise. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 0% and
98% values, while Free cash flow, Risk, Financial constraints, and Size are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. All variables are
standardized, the errors are heteroscedasticity consistent, and we control for industry membership. The sample is pooled for 2006-2010, and
only includes operating companies that are partially owned by holding companies.  
(A) (B) (C)
Table 7: Payout volatility
A: Full sample period 2006-2010
Dividend volatility quintile N Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median Mean p
1 249 0.357 0.144 0.382 0.510 0.304 0.463 -0.154 0.000
2 249 0.649 0.052 0.653 0.595 0.273 0.593 0.054 0.002
3 250 0.829 0.052 0.830 0.659 0.295 0.670 0.170 0.000
4 189 1.001 0.034 1.005 0.695 0.290 0.674 0.306 0.000
5 309 1.140 0.037 1.174 0.724 0.307 0.761 0.417 0.000
p of 5th less 1st quintile 0.000 0.000
B: Sample period 2008-2010
 
Dividend volatility quintile N Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median Mean p
1 144 0.161 0.101 0.174 0.392 0.294 0.295 -0.230 0.000
2 145 0.490 0.106 0.488 0.441 0.277 0.405 0.049 0.047
3 144 0.668 0.034 0.665 0.565 0.314 0.624 0.102 0.000
4 162 0.953 0.085 1.005 0.597 0.323 0.624 0.356 0.000
5 127 1.005 0.000 1.005 0.639 0.330 0.651 0.366 0.000
p of 5th less 1st quintile 0.000 0.000
This table compares the volatility of dividend payout in the holding company to the volatility of dividend payout in the
operating company that the holding company invests in. We define the payout ratio as cash dividends to net operating
earnings and construct payout volatility pairs for holding companies and related operating companies that both pay dividends
at least once during the sample period. Payout volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the dividend payout divided
by the mean payout over the period. Only the portion of dividends reflecting the holding company’s stake in the operating
company is considered. We use the transformation ln(x+1), where x is the payout volatility. The volatility pairs are ranked
across the five quintiles based on the holding company’s dividend volatility. Within each quintile, the two rightmost columns
compare the mean dividend volatility for holding companies and operating companies. The samples only include firms with
at least three years of observations.
Operating company
Holding company
Holding company
Operating company
Difference
Difference
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